Sunday, November 25, 2007

Military Democracy for Thailand?

Chang Noi is one of the keenest foreign observers of the Thai political scene. Here again he is spot on in his analysis.

A new cold war underway in Thailand
Chang Noi
The Nation, November 26, 2007

The Army seems to have its own view of the current situation in the country, and has defined for itself a prominent role in confronting this situation.

This conclusion comes from various documents that are floating around, the authenticity of which has not been denied. It is confirmed by recent actions and policies which are consistent with this way of thinking.

The Army's analysis of the current situation goes like this. There is a "war for the people" in process, meaning a contest for popular support. On one side is the Army. On the other are politicians, and especially former communist activists who lurk in the background of party politics.

A generation ago, the Army won the cold war in Thailand by dragging the communist rebels back from the jungle to a normal life in the city. But, this analysis contends, the activists have never changed their way of thinking or forsaken their ambitions. They aim to use popular support to grab state power, and then to use state power to implement their own agenda, which includes the overthrow of the monarchy. Although they now seek popular support through the ballot box, this is not significantly different from the old guerrilla strategy of mobilising the villages.

Their tools now are the populist policies offered to the electorate. These policies are designed solely to win popular support and gain election to political office. They do not truly solve the problems of the people. Unless something is done to halt this trend, the Army analysis concludes, Thailand will find itself in the same situation as Nepal where Maoists have built massive popular support and are trying to replace the monarchy.

According to this view, the Army has no greater duty at present than fighting this new cold war. Threats to the country from the outside are insignificant, except for the intrusion of drugs and illegal immigrants. Even the situation in the far South is judged less serious. But the Army seems to be already on the defensive in this "war for the people". It feels it must "win back" the people, especially at the grassroots level.

From this analysis of the situation flow strategies and action plans. Several recent actions seem quite consistent with these plans.

First, to win the "war for the people", the Army must be an exemplary institution which is worthy of the respect and support of the people.

Certainly in recent months the media have carried few or no stories about soldiers engaged in protection rackets, drug dealing, or other misdemeanours. Army radio is currently broadcasting a line which goes like this: the Thai Army is unique amongst the militaries of the world in that it works for the people and is responsible in large part for the country's successful development; this fact has gained acknowledgement all over the world.

Second, the Army must gain the support of other official agencies as allies in this war for the people. Under the conditions created by the coup, Army men have had the opportunity to insert themselves into the workings of government at all levels. The Army must use this position to persuade officials to embrace the view of the current situation outlined above, and to accept the implications for action.

Third, ministries and other bureaucratic agencies must draw up long-terms plans and insist upon following these plans in their day-to-day operations so that politicians who are put in charge of these agencies will not be able to implement the policies they promise to the electorate.

Fourth, as a first stage of regaining popular support, the Army must concentrate on merchants, businessmen, and the middle classes. Programmes with this target have already been launched.

Fifth, the Internal Security Operations Command (Isoc) units at the regional and the provincial level must play the key role in mobilising people at the grass roots to support the Army. These Isoc units can use the kamnan, village headmen, and other official bodies at the local level as their tools to win the "war for the people". The recent changes, which have converted the kamnan and village headmen back from elective to bureaucratic positions, are consistent with this strategy.

Ideally the provincial Isoc units should take control of issues like drugs, illegal migration, terrorism, poverty eradication, drought and flood relief so that these policies are more efficient and help win popular support. To ensure success, Army officers need to be better educated and more politically aware so that they are more effective leaders. Demobbed soldiers should be organised to supplement the serving troops, given that the military budget is still insufficient.

Sixth, if these plans are made known to the public, there is a risk that the Army will be accused of digging up the past and reviving dictatorship. Hence, these plans must be implemented using a softly-softly approach, and winning the support of strategic allies at every point.

The implications of this Army strategy are very deep and wide-ranging. Here only a couple of points can be made.

The urgency to pass the Internal Security Act is clearly linked to this "war for the people", and especially to the aim of using provincial Isoc units to fight this war at the grass roots. The legislators supporting the bill should be aware of this.

These plans were drafted when it still looked possible for the Army to engineer a tame coalition through the ballot box on December 23. As this seems less and less likely, what must the Army do to implement this strategy?

Although the military budget has increased by over 50 per cent in the last fifteen months, largely at the expense of social and economic projects, the Army hopes for more funds to pursue this strategy. The fact these plans have floated into the public domain suggests the Army is far from united behind them.

How can such a blinkered, outdated, fear-ridden, divisive, authoritarian, manipulative approach ever lead in the direction of democracy?

Chang Noi

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